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I. Introduction 
Not so long ago, in 2014, EU institutions and Member States heralded the dawn of the 
age of implementation in the EU asylum policy.1 Further legislative harmonisation or 
amendments in the design of the policy were not under consideration. Nonetheless, a 
mere two years later the EU finds itself in the midst of a “refugee crisis”,2 and unable to 
effectively handle the increased arrivals of asylum seekers, many of whom are fleeing 
the armed conflict in Syria. A number of recent contributions argue that the increased 
arrivals were not the main source of the crisis; they merely exacerbated the limitations 
inherent in the conceptualisation of EU’s asylum policy, including lack of fair responsibil-
ity-sharing.3 Therefore, rather than a refugee crisis, we are dealing with a governance 
crisis. In a way, the crisis has laid bare the inadequacies of the EU asylum policy.  
In this article I deal more specifically with the aspect of institutionalisation of practi-
cal cooperation. In the initial policy design, practical cooperation between Member 
States was to support the implementation of the European asylum policy. It basically 
consisted in information exchange through administrative networks and ad hoc pro-
jects. These collaborative efforts soon met their limits in boosting Member States’ ca-
pacity to implement the asylum policy. Their inadequacy to live up to the implementa-
tion challenges led to an institutionalisation push. Institutionalisation of practical co-
operation efforts in the asylum policy came to fruition in 2010 through the adoption of 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) founding regulation.4 
This article explores a particular aspect of the agency’s mandate: operational sup-
port. I first outline key elements of the agency’s mandate through the relevant provi-
sions of the founding regulation. Next, I focus on “EASO in action”, analysing how the 
agency has implemented in particular the operational aspect of its mandate to date, 
and commenting on whether the legal limits are being observed. I also note trends in 
the implementation of the asylum policy portrayed most vividly through operations in 
hotspots. Finally, I comment on aspects of the May 2016 Commission proposal that 
 
1 See European Council conclusions of 26-27 June 2014 and for a commentary see P. DE BRUYCKER, 
The Missed Opportunity of the ‘Ypres Guidelines’ of the European Council Regarding Immigration and Asylum, in 
Migration Policy Centre Blog, 29 July 2014, blogs.eui.eu. 
2 See Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action, in European Commission Press 
Release IP/15/5596 of 9 September 2015.  
3 See E. TSOURDI, Intra-EU solidarity and the implementation of the EU asylum policy: a refugee or 
governance “crisis”?, in Odysseus Academic Network (ed.), Searching for Solidarity in EU Asylum and Border 
Policies, p. 5 et seq., odysseus-network.eu; D. THYM, The “Refugee Crisis” as a Challenge of Legal Design and 
Institutional Legitimacy, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, p. 1 et seq.; T. SPIJKERBOER, Minimalist 
Reflections on Europe, Refugees and Law, in European Papers, 2016, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 533 et seq.; 
M. DEN HEIJER, J. RIJPMA, T. SPIJKERBOER, Coercion, Prohibition, and Great Expectations: The Continuing Failure of 
the Common European Asylum System, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, p. 607 et seq.  
4 Regulation (EU) 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 
establishing a European Asylum Support Office (hereafter: EASO Regulation). 
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aims to revamp EASO into a “European Union Agency on Asylum”.5 I ascertain what the 
envisaged mandate would consist of in terms of operational support and outline the 
persistent legal and political limits to joint implementation in this area. 
II. “Support is our mission”: a critical assessment of EASO’s mandate 
and resources 
A few months after EASO became operational in Malta, its first Executive Director, Robert 
Visser, coined the motto “support is our mission”.6 Thus, the self-projected image of the 
agency’s main task is one of assistance, and more precisely assistance towards Member 
States through operational activities, in order for them to be able to implement their obli-
gations under the asylum acquis. The aim of this section is to explore the agency’s man-
date, as envisaged by the EASO Regulation. I comment on the nature of the agency’s pow-
ers and their stated limitations (section II.1.). A following subsection explores which re-
sources (financial and human) the agency has at its disposal in order to fulfil its mandate 
and whether they respond to the level of ambition surrounding it (section II.2.). 
ii.1. EASO’s mandate: areas of involvement and limitations  
EASO was created on the basis of Arts 74 and 78, paras 1 and 2, TFEU, therefore it was 
conceptualised as a “measure to ensure administrative co-operation” in view of attain-
ing the goal of establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The Commis-
sion considered different options regarding the institutional form that the “office” would 
take, as well as its tasks and powers.7 The alternative options that were under more 
careful consideration, namely strengthening the Asylum Unit at the European Commis-
sion, creating an “executive agency” (meaning delegating powers from the Commission 
to a body), or creating a coordinating Network, were excluded respectively for political, 
budgetary and efficiency reasons.8 The preferred option was: a) the creation of an 
agency; that b) does not possess decision-making power; and c) has to fulfil a number 
of tasks (operational, information-exchange etc). The next paragraphs substantiate this 
statement. 
 
 
5 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, COM(2016) 271 
(hereafter: EUAA proposal).  
6 This motto still features in the EASO website. See www.easo.europa.eu. 
7 See European Commission, Impact Assessment: Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an European Asylum Support Office, 
SEC(2009) 153, pp. 23-29.  
8 See F. COMTE, A New Agency Is Born in the European Union: The European Asylum Support Office, in 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 2010, pp. 380-383. 
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a) EASO: an EU agency. 
EU law lacks a precise definition of the notion of agency. The Commission offered 
its understanding in documents released in 2002 and 2005. In 2002 it noted that exist-
ing agencies had certain formal characteristics in common: “they were created by regu-
lation in order to perform tasks clearly specified in their constituent acts, all have legal 
personality and all have a certain degree of organisational and financial autonomy”.9 
However, it went on to state that their differences far outweigh their similarities and 
proposed a differentiation between executive and regulatory agencies.10 While “execu-
tive” agencies were responsible for purely managerial tasks and subject to strict super-
vision by the Commission, “regulatory” agencies were required to be actively involved in 
the executive function by enacting instruments which help to regulate a specific sec-
tor.11 However, the Commission then distinguishes between two categories of “regula-
tory agencies” the first being “regulatory/decision-making” agencies and the second be-
ing “regulatory/executive agencies”.12 Academic commentators such as Craig13 and Ma-
jone,14 have rightly castigated the latter labelling as confusing.  
In 2005, the Commission specified further the category of regulatory agencies: “the 
term ‘European regulatory agency’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘agency’) shall mean any 
autonomous legal entity set up by the legislative authority in order to help regulate a 
particular sector at European level and help implement a Community policy. The agency 
shall be invested with a public service role. It shall help to improve the way in which 
Community legislation is implemented and applied throughout the EU”.15 
This definition has been characterised as a “step back in precision”16 compared to 
the 2002 Commission Communication. 
Over time, agencies were entrusted with distinct functions, and leading authors 
proceeded to their classification on this basis.17 There is no unison in the categorisa-
 
9 Communication COM(2002) 718 final of 11 December 2002 from the Commission on the operating 
framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, p. 3. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ivi, pp. 3-4.  
12 Ivi, p. 8.  
13 See P. CRAIG, EU Administrative Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 149. 
14 See G. MAJONE, Strategy of Regulatory Reform, in G. DELLA CANANEA (ed.), European Regulatory Agencies, 
Paris: ISUPE Press, 2004, p. 54. 
15 Commission, Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the Operating Framework for the European 
Regulatory Agencies, COM(2005) 59 final, p. 11. 
16 M. CHAMON, EU Agencies Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 6.  
17 See E. VOS, Agencies and the European Union, in L. VERHEY, T. ZWART (eds), Agencies in European and 
comparative perspective, Antwerp, New York: Intersentia, 2003, pp. 119-121; R. VAN OOIK, The Growing 
Importance of Agencies in the EU: Shifting Governance and the Institutional Balance in Good governance and 
the European Union: reflections on concepts, institutions and substance, Antwerp, New York: Intersentia, 
2005, pp. 139-145; D. GERADIN, N. PETIT, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual 
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tions adopted by the different authors, and often one agency may be classified under 
more than one category due to the multitude of functions it is called to fulfil.18 The het-
erogeneity of categories put forth reflects the wealth of functions taken up by agencies, 
including information collection and sharing, application of EU rules in specific cases, 
assistance functions, operational co-operation and decision-making. Another type of 
agency classification adopted for example by Paul Craig,19 or Stefan Griller and Andreas 
Orator,20 rests on whether agencies hold decision-making powers or not.  
Recently, Chamon has proposed a definition on which bodies should be understood 
as “EU agencies”, when they possess the following four elements: “[they are] permanent 
bodies, under EU public law, established by the institutions through secondary legisla-
tion and endowed with their own personality”.21 He then advances that the most perti-
nent categorisation is that of agencies’ powers, rather than of agencies themselves, dis-
tinguishing between powers around decision-making; non-decision-making powers and 
operational tasks.22 I adopt this categorisation for this study. The definition is clear-cut, 
and the categorisation better responds to the challenge of analysing the workings of a 
body that is called to take up a multitude of functions. The research explores next the 
exact nature of EASO and the precise tasks it is called to fulfil. 
Does EASO fulfil the elements of the agency definition described right above? EASO 
was established as a permanent body. It is a body under EU public law, as it was not 
adopted outside the framework of EU law, i.e. by the Member States acting on the basis 
of public international law.23 The third element is also fulfilled since EASO was estab-
lished through secondary legislation, a Regulation of the Council and the European Par-
liament. Finally, EASO is explicitly endowed with its own legal personality24 and “should 
be independent in technical matters and should enjoy legal, administrative and financial 
autonomy”.25 Hence, EASO is an EU agency, despite its denomination in the EASO Regu-
lation as an “office”. 
 
 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, in Yearbook of European Law, 2005, pp. 177-180; E. CHITI, An Important 
Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies, in Common 
Market Law Review, 2009, pp. 1403-1404; M. BUSUIOC, European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 26-27.  
18 Chamon has depicted in a graph the resulting categorisation of specific agencies according to the 
writings of the above-mentioned authors, illustrating how the same agency might be found to fit different 
categories. M. CHAMON, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits, cit., p. 22.  
19 See P. CRAIG, EU Administrative Law, cit., pp. 150-152.  
20 See S. GRILLER, A. ORATOR, Everything Under Control? The “Way Forward” for European Agencies in the 
Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine, in European Law Review, 2010, p. 1 et seq.  
21 M. CHAMON, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits, cit., p. 14. 
22 Ivi, pp. 29-44.  
23 See also EASO Regulation, Art. 40, para. 1, referring to it as a “body of the Union”. 
24 Ibid. 
25 EASO Regulation, eighth recital. 
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b) Exclusion of decision-making powers. 
EASO Regulation explicitly excludes individual decision-making powers: “[t]he Sup-
port Office should have no direct or indirect powers in relation to the taking of deci-
sions by Member States' asylum authorities on individual applications for international 
protection”.26 This formulation is quite far-reaching since it even excludes indirect pow-
ers. It reflects Member States’ initial political unease. They wanted to ensure that the 
agency would not challenge their competence to process asylum claims, as foreseen 
through EU primary law.27 Art. 78, para. 2, let. e), TFEU notably states that one of the 
measures comprising the CEAS is: “criteria and mechanisms for determining which 
Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum or subsidiary 
protection”. This wording clarifies that ultimately “a Member State” should be responsi-
ble for the examination of a particular claim. It therefore becomes apparent that the 
current legal basis in the TFEU excludes centralised assessment of claims, for example 
through an EU agency.  
The agency also holds no powers to adopt general rules.28 EASO Regulation fore-
sees the possibility for EASO to adopt “technical documents on the implementation of 
the asylum instruments of the Union”.29 However, it also clarifies that those documents 
“shall not purport to give instructions to Member States about the grant or refusal of 
applications for international protection”.30 It is thus clear that these documents are not 
legally binding. 
c) EASO’s current mandate. 
Three main areas of activity are envisaged for the agency. First, EASO should facili-
tate, coordinate and strengthen practical cooperation among EU Member States.31 This 
includes the gathering and exchange of country of origin information (COI) and the 
adoption of a common COI methodology, as well as the provision of training for asylum 
officials on the basis of the European Asylum Curriculum (EAC). The second area of ac-
tivity is support towards EU States under particular pressure, drawing upon all useful 
resources at EASO’s disposal, which may include coordinating resources provided by 
Member States.32 This area is intrinsically linked with the element of enhanced solidari-
ty between the Member States. The final area of involvement is the contribution to the 
 
26 EASO Regulation, fourteenth recital. This is reiterated in EASO Regulation, Art. 2, para. 6.  
27 I am referring to Art. 78, para. 2, let. e), stating that “a Member State” should be responsible for 
the examination of an application. 
28 More broadly, legal commentators note that on the basis of the EU Treaties agencies could 
formally not possess the power to adopt normative acts; see, for example, P. CRAIG, EU Administrative Law, 
cit., p. 151 and M. CHAMON, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits, cit., p. 40. 
29 EASO Regulation, Art. 12, para. 2.  
30 Ibid.  
31 See EASO Regulation, Art. 2, para. 1 and Section I.  
32 See EASO Regulation, Art. 2, para. 2 and Section II.  
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development of a CEAS.33 It includes an annual report on the situation on asylum, and 
the possibility to adopt guidelines and operating manuals.  
More broadly the Regulation states that the purpose of the agency is also to “pro-
vide scientific and technical assistance in regard to the policy and legislation of the Un-
ion in all areas having a direct or indirect impact on asylum”, as well as to become “an 
independent source of information on all issues in those areas”.34 The Regulation clari-
fies that this serves the purpose of the agency being able to carry out its duties effec-
tively and lending its full support on asylum.35 
The focus of this contribution is the operational support the agency offers to Mem-
ber States, a function which makes it particularly akin to an instrument of solidarity. Ac-
cording to EASO Regulation, EASO has a mandate to support Member States subject to 
particular pressure which places exceptionally heavy and urgent demands on their re-
ception facilities and asylum systems.36 On the one hand, EASO is called to systematical-
ly identify, collect, and analyse information regarding various aspects of national asylum 
systems under particular pressure.37 This information relates, for example, to the struc-
tures and staff available, as well as information on assistance in the handling and man-
agement of asylum cases.38 When large numbers of third country nationals suddenly 
arrive, EASO is to ensure the rapid exchange of relevant information amongst Member 
States and the Commission.39 In this task, EASO is to make use of existing early warning 
systems and, if necessary, set up its own.40  
The Regulation 604/2013 (hereinafter: recast Dublin Regulation)41 also foresees the 
creation of a mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management that 
includes a role for EASO.42 This mechanism could be triggered either at the request of a 
Member State, or by the Commission, on the basis of information gathered by EASO. 
Once triggered, a two-fold set of measures is to be adopted. First, a preventive action 
plan is to be drawn up in cooperation with the Commission. If, on the basis of EASO’s 
analysis, the implementation of the preventive action plan has not remedied the defi-
ciencies identified, or where there is a serious risk that the asylum situation in that 
 
33 See EASO Regulation, Section III.  
34 Ivi, Art. 2, para. 3.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Ivi, Art. 8.  
37 Ivi, Art. 9.  
38 Ivi, Art. 9, para. 2.  
39 Ivi, Art. 9, para. 3.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Id est Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national 
or a stateless person (recast).  
42 See recast Dublin Regulation, Art. 33.  
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Member State develops into a crisis, a crisis-management action plan is to be set up. 
This is a more structured mechanism than the preventive action plan as it involves close 
monitoring, follow-up, and review every three months. Invocation of any of the two sys-
tems will also mean that appropriate solidarity measures at EU level might be estab-
lished. This mechanism has never been operationalised to date. 
Apart from data collection and exchange, the legislator foresaw that EASO will, at 
the request of the Member State concerned, coordinate actions on the ground.43 The 
requesting Member State should provide a description of the situation; indicate the ob-
jectives of the request for deployment; and estimate the deployment requirements.44 In 
response, EASO is to coordinate the necessary technical and operational assistance.45 
Three main types of action were outlined: actions to facilitate an initial analysis of asy-
lum applications under examination by the competent national authorities; actions de-
signed to ensure that appropriate reception facilities, including emergency reception 
can be made available; and the deployment of Asylum Support Teams (ASTs).46  
ASTs are made up of seconded national experts, including interpreters, participat-
ing in the Asylum Intervention Pool.47 Member States contribute to this Pool by propos-
ing experts that correspond to the required profiles.48 They retain autonomy regarding 
the selection of the number and profiles of deployed experts, as well as the duration of 
their deployment.49 While the Regulation clarifies that they should make those experts 
available for deployment at EASO’s request, it also foresees an exception.50 Member 
States can refuse the deployment if “they are faced with a situation substantially affect-
ing the discharge of national duties, such as one resulting in insufficient staffing for the 
performing of procedures to determine the status of persons applying for international 
protection”.51 This wording weakens the “solidarity potential” of this provision, qualify-
ing the availability of the “pledged” experts.  
An Operating Plan agreed between the Executive Director and the Member State 
requesting assistance measures regulates deployment.52 This plan includes elements 
such as the description of the situation; the geographical area of responsibility in the 
requesting Member State; the forecast duration of the teams’ deployment; tasks and 
special instructions for the teams; and their composition.53 A further organisational el-
 
43 See EASO Regulation, Arts 10 and 13.  
44 Ivi, Art. 13, para. 1.  
45 Ivi, Art. 13, para. 2.  
46 Ivi, Art. 10, let. a)-c).  
47 Ivi, Art. 15. 
48 Ivi, Art. 15, para. 2. 
49 Ivi, Art. 16, para. 1.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ivi, Art. 18, para. 1.  
53 Ivi, Art. 18, para. 1, let. a)-e).  
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ement is the designation of a national contact point in each Member State that is to 
communicate with EASO.54 In addition, the Executive Director is to designate a “Union 
contact point”, meaning one or more Support Office experts, to act on behalf of EASO in 
all aspects regarding the deployment of ASTs.55 They undertake a central coordinating 
function. They are to act as interface between the Member States and EASO, as well as 
between EASO and ASTs; to monitor the correct implementation of the operating plan; 
and to report to EASO on all aspects of the deployment.56 
Finally, the Regulation contains specific provisions on civil and criminal liability of 
the seconded experts that make up the ASTs during their deployment. The host Mem-
ber State is liable for any damage caused during the operations of ASTs.57 However, 
where damage is caused by gross negligence or wilful misconduct, the host Member 
State may approach the home Member State (the State of the deployed expert) to have 
any sums it has paid reimbursed.58 During their deployment, members of an AST are 
treated in the same way as officials of the host State with regard to any criminal offence 
committed by or against them.59 
ii.2. EASO’s resources: a paper tiger? 
Despite the fact that EASO does not hold decision-making powers, its mandate is broad. 
Member States and the EU institutions placed great expectations on it. A characteristic 
example is the following passage from the Communication COM(2014) 154 on making 
an open and secure Europe “happen”: “[t]he European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
will play an important role in this endeavor [i.e. consolidating CEAS], helping to improve 
the quality of asylum assessments and harmonising practices across the EU, also by 
monitoring the quality of asylum decisions and pooling Member States' Country of 
Origin Information (COI)”.60 
The Council conclusions of 8 March 2012 on implementing solidarity included simi-
lar ambitious declarations mentioning EASO no fewer than 25 times in an 8 page docu-
ment.61 EASO was broadly viewed as the panacea that would solve the EU asylum poli-
cy’s implementation problems, without breaching the confines of executive federalism. 
 
54 Ivi, Art. 19.  
55 Ivi, Art. 20, paras 1-2.  
56 Ivi, Art. 20, para. 2, let. a)-d).  
57 Ivi, Art. 21, para. 1.  
58 Ivi, Art. 21, para. 2. See also paras 3-5 for further details.  
59 Ivi, Art. 22.  
60 See Communication COM(2014) 154 final of 11 March 2014 from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, An open and secure Europe: making it happen, p. 6. 
61 Council conclusions of 8 March 2012 on a Common Framework for genuine and practical solidarity 
towards Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems, including through mixed 
migration flows Council of the European Union. 
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This was in addition expected to happen without the EU, or the Member States, digging 
deep in their pockets for money either. 
The agency’s financial resources have been steadily growing, but for the first five 
years of its operations were not commensurate to its tasks and the policy rhetoric sur-
rounding the agency. Its budget started from a modest euro 8 million in 2011,62 was 
raised to euro 10 million in 201263 and again raised in 2013 to reach euro 12 million.64 
The next increase happened in 2014 when the budget jumped to around euro 15,6 mil-
lion65 and remained at about the same level in 2015.66 
To bring a sense of measure to the agency’s budget during these first five years, it is 
interesting to compare it with that of FRONTEX for the same period. In 2011 the 
FRONTEX budget was already as high as euro 86,3 million.67 It slightly decreased in 
2012,68 but then augmented the two following years respectively to euro 93,9 million in 
201369 and euro 97,9 million in 2014.70 The increase during 2015 was impressive, with 
three consecutive amendments adopted during that calendar year and a final budget of 
euro 143 milion.71 Further revealing conclusions can be drawn when studying the pre-
cise allocation per area of activity. Although I do not undertake this analytical exercise in 
detail, I evoke some trends. I leave aside the first two years of the agency’s functioning 
when we could consider that it was still in the early stages of recruiting personnel and 
setting up its activities. In 2013, the small overall budget meant, for example, that a 
mere euro 150˙000 were available for activities on resettlement and the entire area of 
third country support.72 In 2014, no more than euro 250˙000 were budgeted for actions 
related to early warning and data analysis.73 The agency’s external evaluation covering 
the years 2011-2014 nevertheless concluded that “EASO’s budget reflects the agency’s 
stage of development”, essentially treating it as a start-up agency.74 
 
62 See EASO, Etat des recettes et des dépenses du Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile (EASO) pour 
l’exercice 2012, doc. 2012/C 000/12.  
63 Ibid. 
64 EASO, Budget 2013, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 8. 
65 This final amount is included in: EASO, EASO Statement of Revenues and Expenditures 2014: 
Amendment 2/2014, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 9. 
66 The budget was amended twice in 2015. The final amount was euro 15.9 milion. See EASO, EASO 
Statement of Revenues and Expenditures 2015: Amendment 2/2015, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 1. 
67 See FRONTEX, Budget 2011, frontex.europa.eu, p. 5. 
68 It decreased to the amount of euro 84.9 milions. See FRONTEX, Budget 2012, frontex.europa.eu, p. 5.  
69 See FRONTEX, Budget 2013, 4 November 2013, frontex.europa.eu, p. 3.  
70 FRONTEX, Budget 2014, frontex.europa.eu, p. 2. 
71 See FRONTEX, Amended Budget 2015 N3, 6 November 2015, frontex.europa.eu, p. 1.  
72 See EASO, EASO Work Program 2013, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 10. 
73 See EASO, EASO Work Program 2014, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 11.  
74 See Ernst and Young, European Asylum Support Office: Independent External Evaluation of EASO’s 
Activities Covering the Period from February 2011 to June 2014, 2015, p. 81 (hereafter: EASO External 
Evaluation).  
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It was not until 2016 that the EU and its Member States significantly augmented 
EASO’s budget. Already amended three times, the agency’s budget reached euro 56,9 
million.75 This means that the budget quadrupled in the course of a single year and at-
tests to the increasingly operational role that the agency has to play. Indeed, one third 
of its budget (i.e. close to euro 20 million) is geared towards the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey agreement.76 This confirms trends highlighted by the agency’s external eval-
uator, i.e. that over the course of the first five years, operational expenditures have 
been gaining more and more weight both in absolute and relative terms.77 This en-
hanced amount is still a far cry from the resources available to FRONTEX for the current 
year that have augmented to euro 254 million, i.e. around five times more than the 
augmented EASO budget. 
III. Operational support: from expert consultants towards an 
integrated EU administration?  
Operational support constituted one of the first tasks the agency was called upon to ful-
fil, with the Greek Government requesting the deployment of asylum support teams in 
February 2011. The following sections provide an insight into operational support, high-
lighting how it has evolved during the five years of the agency’s operations. They note 
areas where the operationalisation of the mandate stretches, or even exceeds, legal 
limits, meaning either EASO Regulation, or more broadly the confines of executive fed-
eralism as enshrined in the EU Treaties.  
The type of operational activities that deployed experts undertake has evolved 
from expert consultancy towards forms of joint implementation in the “hotspots”. The 
2015 “refugee crisis” marked a new departure in terms of both the overall volume of 
the agency-coordinated deployments, as well as the nature of activities undertaken 
by deployed experts.  
The agency has further refined the types of operational activities to four, without an 
official basis in EASO Regulation. It distinguishes between “special support”;78 “emer-
gency support”;79 “joint processing activities”;80 and the “hotspot approach”. These cate-
 
75 See EASO, EASO Statement of Revenues and Expenditures 2016: Amendment n. 3, 20 September 2016, 
www.easo.europa.eu, p. 2.  
76 Ibid.  
77 Ernst and Young, EASO External Evaluation, cit., pp. 83-85. 
78 This according to EASO refers to “tailor‑made assistance in order to improve the implementation 
of the CEAS: capacity building, facilitation and coordination of relocation, specific support and special 
quality control tools”. See EASO, Types of operations, www.easo.europa.eu. 
79 This refers to “organising solidarity for Member States subject to particular pressures by providing 
temporary support and assistance to repair or rebuild asylum and reception systems”. See ibid.  
80 These refer to “Member States who are in need of external help in the management of their 
specific case-load can request from EASO the deployment of Joint Processing Support Teams. The joint 
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gories offer little conceptual clarity. Relocation is classified under “special support”, 
whereas it is clear that under current practice it constitutes an emergency measure. The 
term “joint processing support teams” is nowhere in EASO Regulation. As the agency 
explains: “joint processing activities are not limited to emergency situations. In fact, as 
part of a broader sense of contingency planning and response, Member States are en-
couraged to enhance their cooperation in this new field based on e.g. geographical 
proximity, or language similarities”.81  
On its website, the agency mentions deployments also in these cases, and mentions 
concepts such as “terms of reference” and agreement for the “main criteria for deploy-
ment”. This would point to a new category of deployment, using parts of the framework 
of the Asylum Support Teams. Nonetheless, the latter according to EASO Regulation are 
reserved for situations of particular pressure. 
A patchwork of practices has thus sprung up and their exact relation to the legal 
mandate is not absolutely clear. While some flexibility and “hands on approach” is nec-
essary, it seems that reality has rendered the predefined legal categories somewhat ob-
solete. This is more so in the case of operations at hotspots. Given the special character 
that operational support under the “hotspot approach” presents and its unique charac-
teristics, I distinguish between EASO operational support outside the hotspot frame-
work, and the hotspot approach. 
iii.1. EASO operational support outside the hotspot approach  
The limits between “emergency support” and “special support” are fluid. As the next 
sections reveal, in practice Special Support Plans often succeed Operating Plans under 
emergency support, whereas the situation continues to be one of particular pressure. 
Hence, I examine these two types of operations together (subsection a). A different ex-
ercise were the pilot projects in joint processing that took place during 2014 and 2015. 
These pilots were not linked with emergency, or a particular need for support (subsec-
tion b). Finally, EASO’s involvement in the external dimension that started sluggishly but 
has been growing in intensity is also part of its operations (subsection c). 
a) Emergency and special support: concepts and operations without borders? 
The Asylum Intervention Pool from which EASO can draw Member States’ experts 
for deployment in Asylum Support Teams was reportedly made of about 500 experts 
grouped under 18 profiles in 2015.82 EASO provided operational assistance to six Mem-
ber States between 2011 and the summer of 2016: Bulgaria; Cyprus; Greece; Italy; Lux-
 
processing activities are launched by EASO and the respective hosting Member State, after the Terms of 
reference, including the main criteria of deployment of the joint processing teams, have been agreed 
upon”. See ibid.  
81 See EASO, Operational support, www.easo.europa.eu. 
82 EASO, Five Years of EASO: Results and Perspectives, 2015, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 13. 
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embourg; Sweden. Even excluding the specific case of hotspots, the operations in these 
Member States present differences.  
Operational support in Luxembourg and Sweden was small scale and short term. In 
Sweden, targeted support was provided in the form of training members of the Swedish 
Migration Board in specific modules so that they could later train colleagues.83 Luxem-
bourg was a similar case; due to an increase in asylum applications the national author-
ity hired simultaneously a new group of five decision-makers who had to be swiftly 
trained.84 Activities revolved around training in specific modules and interviewing tech-
niques.85 While the number of additional decision-makers might not seem impressive in 
abstracto, in concreto it posed a challenge given that Luxembourg’s Refugee Unit num-
bered a total of eight until that point. This illustrates that EASO has adopted a flexible 
understanding of pressure and emergency, and that it assesses this in relative, rather 
than absolute terms.  
Deployments in Cyprus could be clustered under a different category. The needs 
were structural, rather than isolated in a specific area, such as training, and spanned wid-
er in time.86 However, the overall numbers of asylum seekers in Cyprus are modest in an 
absolute scale. This shows that small deployments of ASTs can have a greater impact. 
Measures in Cyprus included workshops on enhancing collection of COI and analytical ca-
pacity; training; vulnerability identification, including age assessment; study visits of Cyp-
riot authorities; and finally, support in reception in the sense of enhancing the capacity of 
the Cypriot Asylum Service in managing and developing improved reception facilities.87 
The other three Member States that EASO assisted, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy, pre-
sent different characteristics. Even before the 2015 “crisis”, they faced arrivals of mixed 
flows that were significant not only in relative, but also in absolute terms, and their asy-
lum systems were underdeveloped, lacking the financial and human resources neces-
sary to meet the implementation challenges. Thus operational assistance has been a 
constant element in these three Member States.  
EASO began operations in Greece in May 2011 under a two-year Operating Plan 
agreed with the Government.88 It has steadily continued to offer assistance through a 
 
83 See EASO, Special Support Plan Swedish Migration Board, 21 December 2012, www.easo.europa.eu. 
84 See EASO, Operating Plan for the Deployment of Asylum Support Teams to Luxembourg, 26 January 
2012, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 4. 
85 Ivi, p. 8.  
86 The Operating Plan for Cyprus, originally adopted in 2014, has been extended twice, from July 
2015 – February 2016 from April 2016 – February 2017. See the original Operating Plan for Cyprus which 
provided for support from October 2013 to September 2014; EASO, EASO Special Support Plan to Cyprus, 5 
June 2014, www.easo.europa.eu.  
87 Ibid.  
88 See EASO Ares(2012)249732 of 1 April 2014, Operating Plan for the Deployment of Asylum Support 
Teams to Greece. 
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second phase plan,89 and later a special support plan.90 More recently, deployments 
concern operations at hotspots, an issue that I explore in the next section. Under the 
two phases of the Operating Plan, Asylum Support Teams assisted Greek Ministries as 
well as the new services, i.e. the Asylum Service responsible for the examination of asy-
lum claims, and the First Reception Service responsible for the identification and refer-
ral of the newly arrived migrants, to build up capacity.  
Actions included planning a strategy to increase and sustain reception capacity for 
prioritised categories of asylum-seekers; developing a reception management system; 
writing a training action plan for reception centres’ staff; training activities, some with 
the involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for all 
members of the appeal committees, interviewers and decision-makers, and the staff of 
the new asylum services.91 The Special Support Plan included actions such as training, 
setting up a system of guardianship of minors, and better managing EU funding.92 70 
experts were deployed under the first plan (2011-2013) and 73 experts under the sec-
ond plan (2013-2014), while training sessions (regarding mainly inclusion, interview 
techniques, evidence assessment and COI) were organised for 524 officials, and 55 
trainers were accredited until July 2014.93  
Assistance to Bulgaria also started under an Operating Plan,94 succeeded by a Sup-
port Plan running from October 2014 to June 2016, and extended again until June 
2017.95 Under the Operating Plan, ASTs in Bulgaria took up more hands on tasks, such 
as support with identification and pre-registration and support with the preparation of 
the asylum file. However, the scale of the deployment under the first plan was modest, 
for example for the first task eight experts were deployed, but apart from one who 
stayed for 90 days, the rest had small missions between 3-12 calendar days each.96 The 
Special Support Plans that succeeded the Operating Plan contain activities of a different 
nature, mainly focusing on training, assistance in statistics and data analysis, or capacity 
building in the area of quality tools.97 
 
89 See EASO, Operating Plan-Phase II for the Deployment of Asylum Support Teams to Greece, 07 March 
2013, www.easo.europa.eu.  
90 EASO EASO/COS/2015/379 of 13 May 2015, EASO Special Support Plan to Greece.  
91 See for analysis P. MCDONOUGH, E. TSOURDI, Asylum and EU Solidarity: The “Other” Greek Crisis, in 
Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2012, pp. 80-96.  
92 See EASO, EASO Special Support Plan to Greece, cit.  
93 See, EASO, EASO Operating Plan for Greece: Interim Assessment of Implementation, 28 July 2014, 
www.easo.europa.eu. For an assessment of the impact of ASTs in Greece see also P. MCDONOUGH, E. 
TSOURDI, The “Other” Greek Crisis: Asylum and EU Solidarity, cit., p. 67 et seq. 
94 See EASO, EASO/COS/2013/336 of 17 October 2013, EASO Operating Plan to Bulgaria.  
95 See respectively, EASO, EASO/COS/2014/975 of 5 December 2014, EASO Special Support Plan to Bulgaria 
and EASO, EASO/2016/COS/924 of 10 June 2016, EASO Special Support Plan to Bulgaria - Amendment No 1. 
96 See EASO, Operating Plan to Bulgaria, cit., p. 6.  
97 See EASO, EASO Special Support Plan to Bulgaria - Amendment No 1, cit., pp. 2-9.  
Bottom-up Salvation? From Practical Cooperation Towards Joint Implementation 1011 
Prior to the hotspot operations, Italy had signed a Special Support Plan that ran 
from June 2013 until the end of 2014,98 extended in March 2015.99 The activities under 
the first plan included support in data collection and analysis (through expert advice 
such as dedicated training and organising workshops); training in interview techniques; 
and study visits for senior management. The second phase of the support plan, while 
including similar activities, also involved elements of joint processing. Deployed experts 
conducted preparatory acts, such as initial registration of claims and case prioritisation, 
COI checks, and vulnerability assessment.100 They were also involved in jointly pro-
cessing incoming and outgoing Dublin requests.101 These actions are the first signs of 
crossing the bridge between support activities and joint implementation. 
b) Joint processing: from concept to reality. 
The idea of joint processing of asylum applications has been lingering in the policy 
agenda, however a feasibility study for the Commission was only concluded in 2013.102 
The content of the term joint processing is yet to be clarified. It allows for the develop-
ment of various practices. For the purpose of the above-mentioned study, the Commis-
sion retained a broad definition:  
“[a]n arrangement under which the processing of asylum applications is jointly conduct-
ed by two or more Member States, or by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 
with the potential participation of the UNHCR, within the territory of the EU, and which 
includes the definition of clear responsibilities during the asylum procedure and possibly 
also for dealing with the person whose application was jointly processed immediately af-
ter a decision on his/her case was taken”.103  
Ramboll and Eurasylum then contemplated different options (feasibility assessment 
technique) ranging from assistance in emergency scenarios through agency deploy-
ments, to a completely harmonised approach, meaning centralised processing.104  
Cognisant of the legal limitation included in the EASO Regulation, I distinguish here 
between three scenarios: assisted processing; common processing; and EU-level pro-
cessing. I understand assisted processing to refer to the examination of asylum applica-
tions by officials of the competent Member State with the support of officials of one or 
another Member State, possibly coordinated through EASO. This would mean in practice 
either that national officials are active at every procedural stage and are merely assisted 
 
98 See EASO, EASO Special Support Plan to Italy, 4 June 2013, www.easo.europa.eu. 
99 See EASO, EASO Special Support Plan to Italy-Phase II, 11 March 2015, www.easo.europa.eu.  
100 Ivi, p. 6.  
101 Ivi, pp. 7-8.  
102 See Ramboll and Eurasylum, Study on the Feasibility and legal and practical implications of 
establishing a mechanism for the joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU, 13 
February 2013, ec.europa.eu. 
103 Ivi, p. 2.  
104 Ivi, pp. 2-4.  
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by the EU (coordinated) level, or that deployed experts are conducting independently ex-
clusively preparatory acts and not undertaking actions or adopting decisions that involve 
administrative discretion. Common processing essentially refers to “mixed”, or “compo-
site” administrative proceedings.105 Broadly speaking: “they ensure that input into single 
administrative procedures can be given from authorities from various jurisdictions. Irre-
spective of whether a final decision will be taken by a Member State or an EU authority, 
both levels can thus be directly involved in a single administrative procedure”.106 
Their “mixed”, or “composite” character refers to the variety of jurisdictions involved 
in a single administrative procedure. Namely, they concern asylum-related decision-
making. They occur when the EU (coordinated) level would be exclusively responsible 
for one or more parts of the procedure that involve taking decisions involving adminis-
trative discretion (such as responsibility determination under Dublin, or proposing a 
decision on the basis of an interview). The final scenario is then EU-level processing, 
where the joint elements disappear, as the decision is taken entirely by an EU authority 
instead of the Member States. This third scenario is legally impossible under the TFEU, 
which envisages that “a Member State” is ultimately responsible for the examination of 
an application.107 The second scenario is also beyond the limits of the current mandate 
of EASO that excludes direct or indirect powers in relation to the taking of decisions by 
Member States' asylum authorities on individual applications for international protec-
tion.108 Only the first scenario is within EASO’s mandate.  
A number of pilot joint processing exercises took place between June 2014 and June 
2015. EASO stated that 22 experts took part in the joint processing pilot projects con-
ducted by EASO in nine Member States in 2014 and 18 experts from 15 Member States 
were involved in three EASO pilot projects in 2015.109 These were one off, short-term 
exercises to test the feasibility (in practice) of these activities. Activities the deployed ex-
perts undertook fell both under the first and second scenarios contemplated above. 
Two examples illustrate this point. 
 
105 On mixed or composite administrative proceedings in EU law more broadly see characteristically: 
G. DELLA CANANEA, The European Union's Mixed Administrative Proceedings, in Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 2004, p. 197 et seq.; M.P. CHITI, Forms of European Administrative Action, in Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 2004, p. 37 et seq.; H.C. HOFMAN, Composite Decision-Making Procedures in EU Administrative Law, 
in H.C. HOFMAN, A. TÜRK (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law: Towards an Integrated 
Administration, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009, p. 136.  
106 D.U. GALETTA et al., The Context and Legal Elements of a Proposal for a Regulation on the 
Administrative Procedure of the European Union's Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies, European 
Parliament, December 2015, p. 17.  
107 See TFEU, Art. 78, para. 2, let. e), and above subsection II.1.c.  
108 See above subsection II.1.b. 
109 EASO, Five Years of EASO, cit., p.14.  
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A pilot implemented in Poland from 19 January to 11 February 2015 deployed 
twelve experts from eight countries in three locations.110 Two teams performed joint 
registration and identification of applicants together with the Polish Border Guards.111 
This involvement falls under the first scenario, that of assisted processing, since EASO 
stressed that they were continuously “under the supervision of the Polish Border 
Guards”. Another team jointly processed Dublin cases within the Dublin Unit. Regarding 
that part of the deployment: “[d]ue to the existing high level of harmonization (common 
templates, DubliNet, English as working language) they were operational within two 
days and performed their tasks independently. They were able to register and archive 
their own cases in the Polish national database”.112 
In this case, whether we are in the first or second scenario depends on the extent 
of administrative discretion involved in “registering and archiving”. If the deployed 
experts actually made the decision on which Member State was responsible for pro-
cessing the application as part of their tasks, then this concerned a form of common, 
rather than assisted processing, as this decision involves elements of administrative 
discretion. If they were merely typing in and archiving the decisions taken by the 
Polish Authorities, this was assisted processing. 
Another “Asylum Determination Pilot”, involving Belgian and Swedish officials, was 
implemented in the Netherlands between 23 February and 13 March.113 This operation 
practically consisted of the following: “[t]heir task was to perform in-merit personal in-
terviews and based on the results, prepare the draft decisions. The Belgian members of 
the Processing Support Team performed their tasks in Dutch, while the Swedish expert 
used the English language (including recording the minutes of the interview)”.114 
These experts were not merely assisting the Dutch authorities; “each expert started 
working independently on their assigned cases within the first days of the exercise”.115 
This is arguably the second scenario, common processing, which raises distinct legal 
questions. These pilots prepared the ground for operations in hotspots. I explore the 
legal implications of the trend towards joint implementation and the questions that (de 
facto) mixed administrative proceedings raise below.  
c) Operational support in third countries: new frontiers? 
Activities in this area only properly started in 2013 with the adoption of the “Exter-
nal Action Strategy” in November 2013. This is a mainly descriptive document listing the 
possible priorities, actions, funding schemes and partners, rather than a strategy.116 
 
110 See EASO, Newsletter, March 2015, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 6. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Ivi, p. 10. 
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
116 See EASO, EASO External Action Strategy, 2013, www.easo.europa.eu.  
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The main message it convenes is that supporting capacity-building in third countries by 
helping them to improve their asylum and reception capacities is the primary aim of the 
external action of the EASO.117 The most concrete initiative taken up to date was a 28 
months project during the period 2014-2016. It aimed at familiarising Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia with the mandate, tools, and instruments of EASO and FRONTEX and was 
funded by the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument.118 Activities in this frame-
work mainly revolved around study visits of officials from the third countries in question 
to Member States’ administrations, their participation in EASO training sessions, and 
needs assessment visits of EASO officials to the third countries in question.119 The 
agency envisages implementation of similar type of support activities in the framework 
of Regional Development and Protection Programs, in particular with respect to North 
Africa, as well as the Western Balkans and Turkey.120 
EASO has paid little attention to resettlement as part of its external action. Most ac-
tivities at EU level in this field took place through the Resettlement and Relocation Fo-
rum. This Forum met upon the initiative of the European Commission, and through the 
European Resettlement Network.121 The latter is an initiative aiming at supporting the 
development of resettlement in Europe that was launched in May 2012 with the finan-
cial support of the EU and coordinated by the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Interna-
tional Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). The situation is not likely to change as 
EASO allocated only Euro 90,000 in 2016 for resettlement, with one full time person 
working in this activity.122 Its role continues to be limited, with the main activities planned, 
being for it to constitute a “clearing house” in exchanging information, developing relevant 
methodologies and tools, and organising a practical cooperation meeting on resettle-
ment.123 Finally, apart from the specific case of Schengen associated countries, EASO has 
concluded no working arrangements with third country authorities competent in technical 
aspects of the areas covered by its founding regulation. This is one more element reflect-
ing the weakness of the external action of the agency due to the negligible means it can 
allocate up to date to this area in the scope of its limited budget. 
EASO’s reticence is linked with the trend noted by the external evaluator of the 
agency’s work that found no consensus on third-country support amongst Member 
 
117 See P. DE BRUYCKER, E. TSOURDI, Building the Common European Asylum System beyond Legislative 
Harmonisation: Practical Cooperation, Solidarity and External Dimension, in V. CHETAIL, P. DE BRUYCKER, F. 
MAIANI (eds), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law, Leiden, 
Boston: Brill/Nijhoff, 2016, p. 491.  
118 See information on this project at the EASO website www.easo.europa.eu.  
119 Ibid.  
120 See EASO, EASO Work Program 2016, 2015, www.easo.europa.eu, p. 32.  
121 See information on the European Resettlement Network through its website www.resettlement.eu. 
122 See EASO, EASO Work Program 2016, 2015, cit. p. 35.  
123 Ivi, pp. 34-35.  
Bottom-up Salvation? From Practical Cooperation Towards Joint Implementation 1015 
States.124 This was due to both divergence in terms of prioritising which countries 
should be supported first, and to reluctance to allocate part of EASO’s already limited 
budget to third country support.125 Where there seemed to be more agreement was on 
EASO stepping up its role on resettlement.126  
iii.2. Hotspots as the breeding ground for an integrated European 
administration 
The final type of EASO operational support is framed under the “hotspot approach” to 
migration management. The meaning of this term is not self-evident. In fact, there is no 
precise legal definition, nor a concerted legal framework regulating this concept that 
has flooded the EU policy debate. After being evoked in a feasibility study conducted at 
the Commission’s behest,127 the “hotspot approach” emerged in an EU policy document 
through the Commission’s EU Agenda on Migration:  
“the Commission will set up a new 'Hotspot' approach, where the European Asylum Sup-
port Office, Frontex and Europol will work on the ground with frontline Member States to 
swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. The work of the agencies will be 
complementary to one another. Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into 
an asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as 
quickly as possible. For those not in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States by 
coordinating the return of irregular migrants. Europol and Eurojust will assist the host 
Member State with investigations to dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks”.128 
The hotspot approach concerns inter-agency collaboration, where deployed nation-
al experts under the coordination of a specific agency operationally assist national ad-
ministrations. This approach is novel: although the respective agency regulations fore-
saw deployments,129 the element of interagency collaboration in what in essence would 
be a single operational framework was never before so clearly articulated. Moreover, 
although deployed experts under FRONTEX have an intense operational role, the study 
analysed how the majority of tasks that earlier EASO deployments undertook could be 
 
124 Ernst and Young, EASO External Evaluation, cit., p. 58. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid.  
127 See Unisys, Study on the Feasibility of the Creation of a European System of Border Guards to Control 
the External Borders of the Union ESBG, 2014, pp. 24-27, ec.europa.eu. 
128 Communication COM(2015) 240 final of 13 May 2015 from the Commission on A European Agenda 
on Migration, p. 6. 
129 At the time of their development, the following legal rules applied to deployments of experts for 
the two agencies that mainly relate to asylum-relevant tasks: Regulation (EU) 1168/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union, Arts 8-8h and EASO Regulation, Ch. 3.  
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more accurately described as expert consulting. This section explores both the policy 
framing and the operationalisation of the hotspot approach that has led to an unprece-
dented integration between the EU and national levels. 
a) The hotspot approach and Migration Management Support Team: definitional 
unpacking. 
The notion of hotspot itself was developed in an informal explanatory note circulated 
by Commissioner Avramopoulos in July 2015 to the Justice and Home Affairs Council,130 
which stated: 
“[a] ‘Hotspot’ is characterized by specific and disproportionate migratory pressure, consist-
ing of mixed migratory flows, which are largely linked to the smuggling of migrants, and 
where the Member State concerned might request support and assistance to better cope 
with the migratory pressure. […] In principle, an external border section should be consid-
ered to be a ‘Hotspot’ for the limited period of time during which the emergency or crisis 
situation subsists and during which the support of the ‘Hotspot’ approach is necessary”.131  
In the meantime, the new Regulation on a European Border and Coast Guard in-
cludes a precise definition:132 “‘hotspot area’ means an area in which the host Member 
State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States coop-
erate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory 
challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at 
the external borders”.133 
Therefore, a “hotspot” is in essence an EU external border section facing high num-
bers of arrivals of third country nationals. Most often in practice, it consists of arrivals of 
individuals who have international protection needs, for example, fleeing persecution 
or generalised violence, together with individuals who do not present these needs.  
The “hotspot approach” was more precisely elaborated in an annex to the Septem-
ber 2015 Commission Communication on managing the refugee crisis.134 Therein, the 
Commission clarified that: “[t]he approach is an operational concept to maximize the 
added value of this support through Migration Management Support Teams. This is an 
operational framework for the Agencies to concentrate their support on the spot where 
 
130 The note, accompanying as an annex a letter dated 15 July 2015 of Commissioner Avramopoulos, is 
accessible through Statewatch; see Statewatch, Explanatory note on the “Hotspot” approach, www.statewatch.org. 
131 Ibid.  
132 See Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 
2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard (hereafter: EBCG Regulation). For analysis see P. DE 
BRUYCKER, The European Border and Coast Guard: A New Model Built on an Old Logic, in European Papers, 
2016, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 559 et seq. 
133 See EBCG Regulation, Art. 2, para. 10. 
134 See Communication COM(2015) 490 final of 23 September 2015 of the Commission, Annex II to the 
Communication on Managing the Refugees Crisis: Immediate Operational, Budgetary and Legal Measures under 
the European Agenda on Migration. 
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it is most needed, to coordinate their interventions and to cooperate closely with the 
authorities of the host Member State”.135 
Interagency cooperation therefore finds its expression through the Migration Man-
agement Support Teams. This term was initially only included in policy documents. More 
recently, it has been defined in the new EBCG Regulation as: “a team of experts which 
provide technical and operational reinforcement to Member States at hotspot areas and 
which is composed of experts deployed from Member States by the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency and by the European Asylum Support Office, and from the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency, Europol or other relevant Union agencies”.136  
As I analyse below, the proposed Regulation on a European Union Agency for Asy-
lum also includes provisions related to Migration Management Support Teams and 
types of operational and technical reinforcement they would provide.137  
It becomes apparent that there is no over-arching legal framework regulating the 
hotspots or the deployment of Migration Management Support Teams. What exists is a 
patchwork of policy documents and guidelines and disparate provisions in the existing 
or upcoming foundational regulations of the EU agencies. Further provisions contained 
in the two emergency relocation decisions refer indirectly to hotspots.138 Although such 
an approach is flexible, it also presents challenges for the legality of actions that are 
currently undertaken in the framework of hotspots. The detailed examination of all pro-
cesses taking place in a hotspot extends beyond the object of this contribution.139 I will 
focus instead on two issues of interest: how the operation of hotspots relates to the re-
location mechanisms; and how the operation of hotspots, and consequent deployment 
of national experts, leads to increasing integration between the EU and national levels 
in conducting asylum procedures.  
b) Hotspots and relocation mechanisms: a necessary complement?  
Hotspots are intrinsically linked with the emergency relocation mechanisms.140 Alt-
hough the two Council Decisions do not mention these terms explicitly, the provisions 
pertaining to “operational support to Italy and Greece”141 refer to the hotspot approach 
 
135 Ivi, p. 2.  
136 EBCG Regulation, Art. 2, para. 9. 
137 See EUAA proposal, in particular twentieth recital and Art. 21.  
138 The study analyses this issue in the next subsection.  
139 For a detailed outlining of the tasks to be performed at hotspots by different agencies see: D. 
NEVILLE, S. SY, A. RIGON, On the Frontline: The Hotspot Approach to Managing Migration, European Parliament, 
2016, pp. 27-29.  
140 See Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in 
the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece (hereafter: 1st Emergency 
Relocation Decision) and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece (hereafter: 2nd 
Emergency Relocation Decision). 
141 See 1st Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 7 and 2nd Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 7.  
1018 Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi 
in all but name. The decisions create an obligation for the other Member States to “in-
crease their operational support in cooperation with Italy and Greece in the area of in-
ternational protection through relevant activities coordinated by EASO, Frontex and 
other relevant Agencies, in particular by providing, as appropriate, national experts”.142 
This reference to interagency cooperation is central to the hotspot notion. The two de-
cisions specifically foresee the following activities: 
– the screening of the third-country nationals arriving in Italy and Greece, including 
their clear identification, fingerprinting and registration, and, where applicable, the reg-
istration of their application for international protection and, upon request by Italy or 
Greece, their initial processing;  
– the provision to applicants or potential applicants that could be subject to reloca-
tion pursuant to this Decision of information and specific assistance that they may need;  
– the preparation and organisation of return operations for third-country nationals 
who either did not apply for international protection or whose right to remain on the 
territory has ceased.143  
Finally, the decisions state that “for the purpose of facilitating the implementation 
of all steps of the relocation procedure, specific support shall be provided as appropri-
ate to Italy and to Greece through relevant activities coordinated by EASO, Frontex and 
other relevant Agencies”.144  
The activities outlined above, although they encompass the relocation procedure, 
extend far beyond it. Essentially, they start from the identification and fingerprinting of 
arriving migrants and end with their potential relocation, return, or channelling to the 
national asylum procedure. Therefore, although according to the title of the instru-
ments the provisional measures are supposed to concentrate on the “area of interna-
tional protection”, in reality the Council has anchored therein migration-management 
assistance measures.  
This approach is understandable on several counts. First, there was no other legal 
instrument covering this collaborative interagency approach. Second, this does not go 
beyond the competence established by Art. 78, para. 3, TFEU that allows for provisional 
measures, for the benefit of Member States faced “with an emergency situation charac-
terised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries”. The sudden inflow generates 
needs not only related to the processing of asylum claims, but also related to the initial 
reception, identification and referral of arriving individuals, and extends to the phase of 
potential return. Finally, the approach reveals that the provisional people-sharing is ac-
companied with an obligation to “put one’s house in order”.  
 
142 See 1st Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 7, para. 1 and 2nd Emergency Relocation Decision, 
Art. 7, para. 1.  
143 Ibid.  
144 See 1st Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 7, para. 2 and 2nd Emergency Relocation Decision, 
Art. 7, para. 2.  
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A different provision in the decisions, which calls for “complementary measures to be 
taken by Italy and Greece”, illustrates this point.145 These include the adoption of a 
roadmap which “shall include adequate measures in the area of asylum, first reception 
and return, enhancing the capacity, quality and efficiency of their systems in these areas, 
as well as measures to ensure appropriate implementation of this Decision”.146 Consider-
ing these obligations, Francesco Maiani has critically observed: “[o]n the whole, notwith-
standing the ‘assistance’ rhetoric, hotspots are clearly designed to shift back on frontline 
states all the responsibilities they (theoretically) shoulder under current EU legislation: to 
identify migrants, to provide first reception, to identify and return those who do not claim 
protection, and to channel those who do so towards asylum procedures in the responsi-
ble state – in most cases, none other than the frontline state itself”.147  
Therefore, emergency relocation inscribed in this framework is meant to establish a 
renewed impetus for Member States at the external borders to implement their obliga-
tions. Hotspots and emergency relocation are complementary; in fact, emergency relo-
cation is meant to somewhat offset the increased obligations that Member States at the 
external border incur under the current rules. Another provision that foresees a new 
type of sanction for non-implementation of the above obligations evidences this logic. 
Namely, the Commission may decide, “having given the State concerned the opportuni-
ty to present its views”, to suspend the applicability of emergency relocation mecha-
nisms for three months; a period that could be extended once.148  
As a result, parallel to the rolling out of the emergency relocation procedure, Italy149 
and Greece150 have each adopted a roadmap containing an array of measures that they 
would implement, including setting up initial registration and identification centres, that 
have ended up also being referred to as “hotspots”.151 Italy committed to set up six 
 
145 See 1st Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 8 and 2nd Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 8.  
146 See 1st Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 8, para. 1 and 2nd Emergency Relocation Decision, 
Art. 8, para. 1.  
147 See F. MAIANI, Hotspots and Relocation Schemes: the Right Therapy for the Common European Asylum 
System?, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 3 February 2016, eumigrationlawblog.eu. 
148 See 1st Emergency Relocation Decision, Art. 8, para. 2 and 2nd Emergency Relocation Decision, 
Art. 8, para. 2.  
149 An annotated, unofficial English translation of the Italian roadmap is available through Statewatch; see 
Y. MACCANICO, The Italian Roadmap 2015: Hotspots, Readmissions, Asylum Procedures and the Re-opening of 
Detention Centres, November 2015, www.statewatch.org. The full reference for the official text in Italian is 
Ministero dell’Interno, Roadmap Italiana, 28 September 2015, www.statewatch.org. 
150 Greece presented its roadmap to the Council on 1 October 2015; see Communication COM(2016) 
165 final of 16 March 2016 from the Commission, First Report on Relocation and Resettlement (hereafter: 
First Report on Relocation), p. 2. 
151 Although, as analysed above, a “hotspot” is the entire border area that is facing high numbers of 
arrivals of mixed migration flows, in practice the term “hotspot” is also used by policy-makers and the 
press when referring to specific centres of identification and registration in these border areas.  
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hotspots: five in Sicily and one in Apulia,152 while Greece committed to setting up five on 
islands in the Aegean Sea.153 Moreover, it is foreseen that an EU Regional Taskforce (EU 
RTF), headquartered in each of the two Member States would coordinate operational 
support. This is in effect an operational hub that pools officers from FRONTEX, EASO 
and Europol, as well as from the host Member State.154 Representatives from EUROJUST 
and other EU agencies may be deployed as well in the EU RTF, while it is also charged 
with liaising with other organisations.155 Initially, there was foot-dragging by the two 
Member States regarding the hotspot component, with the Commission continuously 
following-up on and publicly reporting on the slow progress achieved.156  
By mid-June 2016 all five hotspots on the Greek territory were operational,157 while by 
mid-July 2016 four of the six hotspots were operational in Italy, and since arrivals took 
place also in different locations, the European Commission and Italian authorities had 
agreed to set up mobile hotspots.158 The EU Regional Task Forces are also operational, 
based in Pireaus (Athens) and Catania (Sicily). The Commission has started to report pub-
licly in the same document about the progress by the two Member States in building up 
asylum capacity and implementing their roadmaps, and the progress of the other Mem-
ber States in offering relocation places and making available experts for deployment. 
Therefore, the “naming and shaming” goes in all directions and the quid pro quo of assis-
tance in exchange for implementation of the original obligations is becoming more evi-
dent. The ultimate goal is to return to the “normal” running of the Dublin system, includ-
ing returns to those two frontline Member States of applicants who have conducted sec-
ondary movements outside the relocation framework.159 The next subsection of this re-
 
152 See European Commission, First Report on Relocation, cit., p. 2.  
153 Ivi, p. 5.  
154 See D. NEVILLE, S. SY, A. RIGON, On the Frontline: The Hotspot Approach, cit., p. 27.  
155 Ibid.  
156 See Communication COM(2015) 510 final of 14 October 2015 from the Commission on managing 
the refugee crisis: State of play of the implementation of the priority actions under the European Agenda 
on Migration; Communication COM(2015) 678 final of 15 December 2015 from the Commission, Progress 
Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Greece; Communication COM(2016) 85 final of 10 February 
2016 from the Commission on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the 
European Agenda on Migration; Commission, Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hotspots 
Approach in Greece, COM(2016) 141 final. 
157 See Communication COM(2016) 416 final of 15 June 2016 from the Commission, Fourth Report on 
Relocation and Resettlement, p. 5. 
158 Ivi, p. 7. 
159 Dublin returns to Italy are continuing, although there is jurisprudence of asylum seekers 
contesting their transfer to Italy, mainly on the basis of deficiencies in the reception conditions in that 
Member State. See European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 4 November 2011, no. 29217/12, 
Tarakhel v. Switzerland. Regarding Greece, there is currently a de facto halt of returns under the Dublin 
system as a result of the European Court of Human Rights and CJEU case-law. The Commission has 
repeated that the aim is the resumption of the Dublin system, notably the resumption of returns of 
asylum seekers to Greece. See Commission Recommendation C(2016) 871 of 10 February 2016 
 
Bottom-up Salvation? From Practical Cooperation Towards Joint Implementation 1021 
search comments on the sustainability of this approach. I first analyse the practical effects 
and dynamics resulting from the collaborative processes between the EU and national 
administrations in this new setting of hotspots, and ascertain what trends they reveal. 
c) Hotspots and agency-coordinated operational activities: is the increasing integra-
tion between the EU and national levels stretching or exceeding the current legal limits? 
The deployed experts in hotspots are to be operational, conducting a variety of tasks 
(such as identification, registration, etc.) alongside national administrations. Agency-
coordinated deployments in Greece are currently much more extensive than those in Ita-
ly.160 This has to do with the fact that arrivals of irregular migrants during the early 
months of 2016 through the sea borders, where the hotspots are situated in Greece, con-
tinued to be high.161 Moreover, a trend that was critically observed earlier in 2016 in the 
study for the European Parliament by Neville, Sy and Rigon on hotspots162 continues. 
Namely, FRONTEX deployments greatly outnumber those of other agencies. FRONTEX has 
currently deployed in hotspots on Greek soil 474 seconded national officers, compared to 
121 EASO-deployed national experts; while in Italy there are 89 FRONTEX-deployed se-
conded officers, compared to 19 EASO-deployed national experts.163 
The numbers lead to concerns over the potential disproportionate emphasis placed 
in hotspots on preventing irregular migration and effecting return, rather than on grant-
ing immediate humanitarian assistance and asylum processing.164 Prior to the operation 
of the hotspots this emphasis on border control and return was not as present in Italy or 
Greece; in reality it is the EU level involvement that has brought it about. Increased capaci-
ty came with a particular focus. The clear turn to the objective of implementing return 
through hotspots in Greece after the operationalisation of the EU-Turkey deal compounds 
 
addressed to the Hellenic Republic on the urgent measures to be taken by Greece in view of the 
resumption of transfers under Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013; European Commission, Back to Schengen - A 
Roadmap, COM(2016) 120 final and Commission Recommendation C(2016) 3805 of 15 March 2016 
addressed to the Hellenic Republic on the urgent measures to be taken by Greece in view of the resumption 
of transfers under Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013; and, more recently, Commission Recommendation C(2016) 
6311 of 28 February 2016 addressed to the Hellenic Republic on the urgent measures to be taken by Greece 
in view of the resumption of transfers under Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013. 
160 See European Commission, Hotspot State of Play, 11 November 2016, ec.europa.eu. 
161 Statistics to that extent are available (in Greek) from the Hellenic Police and report the 
apprehension of 155,679 migrants by the Greek Coast Guard in the Greek-Turkish sea borders during the 
first six months of 2016. See Hellenic Police, Statistics on Irregular Entry at the Greek Turkish Border for the 
First Six Months of 2016 (author’s own translation), www.astynomia.gr. 
162 See D. NEVILLE, S. SY, A. RIGON, On the Frontline: The Hotspot Approach, cit., in particular pp. 34-35, 
38-39 and 42.  
163 Author’s own calculations on the basis of the Commission official data.  
164 Frances Webber has expressed this concern as a potential outcome before the hotspots had even 
begun functioning: “EU’s relocation package could turn out to be a fig leaf for a quiet but massive removal 
operation against, rather than a protection operation for, those arriving on Europe’s shores”. See F. 
WEBBER, “Hotspots” for Asylum Applications: Some Things We Urgently Need to Know, in EU Law Analysis, 29 
September 2015, eulawanalysis.blogspot.be. 
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these concerns. Aspects of this deepening of administrative integration are also at the 
fringes, if not outside, the current legal framework at EU or national levels. I substantiate 
these points in greater detail below focusing on the case of Greece.  
In Greece, national administrative law caught up with the deepening of integration 
between the EU and national levels.165 Notably, a law adopted in April 2016 and 
amended in June 2016, transposing among other elements the recast Asylum Proce-
dures Directive, establishes an accelerated border asylum procedure, addressing also 
the situation at hotspots.166 It states that in case of large number of arriving third coun-
try nationals or stateless persons who seek asylum at border areas, in transit zones, or 
in centres of reception and identification (which is the name given under Greek legisla-
tion to hotspots), an exceptional procedure applies.167 Its main elements are: a) asylum 
claims may be recorded by personnel of the Greek Police or the Greek Armed Forces; b) 
interviews with applicants for international protection may be conducted by personnel 
made available by EASO; c) extremely truncated deadlines for asylum processing, nota-
bly a deadline of one day for applicants to prepare for the first-instance interview, and a 
maximum of three days for deciding on appeals.168  
This exceptional procedure may not be applied to individuals belonging to vulnera-
ble groups, or to persons falling within the family provisions of the recast Dublin Regu-
lation.169 The national law also contains provisions on finding an application inadmissi-
ble, which include protection in a safe third country and first country of asylum.170 This 
guarantees that there is an actual admissibility procedure, anchored within the asylum 
framework. Nevertheless, this does not mean the legislation and ensuing practice is be-
yond reproach. 
This research comments first on the collaboration between the Greek Asylum Ser-
vice (the administrative body responsible for first-instance decision-making) and EASO-
coordinated experts. The provisions in national law on EASO involvement were amend-
ed in June 2016. Notably, the original April 2016 version of Law 4375/2016 stated that 
interpreters, as well as seconded personnel made available by EASO, may assist the 
Greek Asylum Service in recording the claim; the interview; and any other process. The 
 
165 I am referring to Law no. 4375 of 3 April 2016. The amendments to the law were published on the 
22nd June 2016, Official Gazette of the Greek Government, Series A, Issue No. 117. I comment on the law 
on the basis of the original Greek version. For some information on the legislative framework in English 
see ECRE, Greece urgently adopts controversial law to implement EU-Turkey deal, 8 April 2016, www.ecre.org 
and ECRE, Greece: Asylum Reform in the Wake of the EU-Turkey Deal, 4 April 2016, www.asylumineurope.org, 
and for the amendments of June 2016 see ECRE, Greece: Appeal Rules Amended After Rebuttal of Turkey's 
Safety, 16 June 2016, www.asylumineurope.org. 
166 See Law 4375/2016, Art. 60, para. 4.  
167 Ibid.  
168 Ibid.  
169 Ibid.  
170 See Law 4375/2016, Art. 54.  
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prior version of the Greek law was compatible with the limitations upon EASO according 
to its mandate, notably that it “shall have no powers in relation to the taking of deci-
sions by Member States' asylum authorities on individual applications for international 
protection”.171 That version of the law stated that the Greek Asylum Service can be as-
sisted (μπορεί να επικουρείται) by EASO experts and interpreters. However, it did not 
reflect the administrative reality on the ground. Hence, the law was amended in June 
2016 to state that deployed experts can conduct asylum interviews.  
EASO-deployed experts at hotspots in Greece are independently conducting a part 
of the asylum process that entails discretion. They conduct the asylum admissibility in-
terviews on behalf of the Greek Asylum Service, at least in the majority of cases, then 
submit their findings, on the basis of which the Service issues the final admissibility de-
cision.172 Inherent parts of this process are assessing the credibility of the applicants, 
detecting vulnerability, and making a finding on the safety of third countries; all of these 
entail elements of discretion. The level of involvement of deployed experts is also dis-
cernible through EASO’s Operating Plan in Greece.173 An amendment to that plan added 
a new measure entitled “support with the implementation of the admissibility proce-
dure”.174 The objective of that action is described as “[a]pplications for international 
protection processed on a case-by-case basis and their admissibility assessed”.175 
 
171 See EASO Regulation, Art. 2, para. 6.  
172 See Gisti, Accord UE-Turquie, la grande Imposture: Rapport des Mission dans le Hotspots grecs de Lesbos 
et Chios, 2016, p. 13, where it is stated on the basis of a mission in Lesvos and Chios: “les agents de l’EASO 
conduisent l’entretien initial prévu par la procédure accélérée et veillent au préalable à ce qu’il soit procédé à 
l’identification des causes éventuelles de vulnérabilité et aux examens utiles. Ils soumettent leur avis aux 
services grecs de l’immigration et de l’asile, qui statuent ensuite sur la recevabilité de la demande d’asile”. 
See also C. ZIEBRITZKI, Chaos in Chios: Legal Questions Regarding the Administrative Procedure in the Greek 
Hotspots, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy/Odysseus Blog, 26 June 2016, eumigrationlawblog.eu. 
That author, a researcher at the Max Planck Institute conducting on-site research in Chios, reports regarding 
the hotspot on that island: “[a]t least in the majority of cases, EASO staff conduct the admissibility interview. 
The decision on admissibility is then issued by the Asylum Service”. See, finally, Human Rights Watch, Greece: 
Refugee “Hotspots” Unsafe, Unsanitary, 19 May 2016, where based on visits of that NGO at the hotspots of 
Samos, Lesbos, and Chios in mid-May 2016 it is reported that: “[t]he hotspots, officially called ‘Reception and 
Identification Centers’ are nominally administered by the Greek government’s First Reception Service, under 
the Migration Policy Ministry. Two EU agencies are a more visible presence: Frontex, the EU’s external 
borders agency, which conducts the initial registration, nationality screening interviews, and fingerprinting in 
collaboration with the Greek police, and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which conducts 
admissibility interviews and makes recommendations on admissibility to the asylum procedure to the Greek 
Asylum Service”.  
173 See EASO, EASO/COS/2016/391 of 1st April 2016, EASO Hotspot Operating Plan to Greece: 
Amendment No. 2, pp. 3-4.  
174 Ivi, p. 3.  
175 Ivi, p. 4.  
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Among the deliverables feature “[a]dmissibility interviews conducted, decisions recom-
mended and applicants notified”.176  
The administrative reality is that this moves beyond assisted processing, to the 
realm of common processing. In terms of EU administrative law then, there is already 
an emergence of a variant of procedures that could be understood as de facto compo-
site, or mixed, administrative procedures. Namely, although the asylum decision-maker 
at first instance according to both EU and national law is the Greek Asylum Service, de 
facto this decision is based on a recommendation from, and facts ascertained during, an 
interview conducted by experts deployed by an EU agency. Hence, this is morphing de 
facto into a composite process. 
These operations at hotspots arguably give “powers in relation to the taking of deci-
sions on individual applications”, in the very least indirect powers.177 In this sense they 
exceed the legal limits under the EASO regulation. There is no CJEU case-law on what a 
direct or an indirect power is in relation to the taking of a decision on an individual ap-
plication for international protection. However, emitting an opinion, even a non-binding 
one, on an individual case, on the basis of an independently conducted interview argu-
ably qualifies at least as an “indirect power”. The Commission’s proposal seeks to ad-
dress this disjuncture as analysed in the next section.  
Nevertheless, this administrative reality does not exceed the legal limitations placed 
by EU primary law, i.e. Art. 78, para. 2, let. e), TFEU which foresees that “a Member State” 
is to be responsible for the examination of an application. The deployed experts are only 
formulating an opinion, which is not binding on the Greek Asylum Service according to 
law. It is the Greek Asylum Service that formally adopts the admissibility decision, and it 
has the power to adopt a decision that goes against the proposal of the deployed experts. 
While formally this does not go against the EU Treaties, in practice, given that overloaded 
Greek administrators are not present during what seems to be at least the majority of 
admissibility interviews, it is reasonable to assume that their role could amount to rub-
berstamping a decision whose merits were decided by the deployed experts.  
This operational involvement of the EU also poses subsequent procedural ques-
tions. Notably, what rights do applicants enjoy during this interview with deployed ex-
perts, which is a crucial part of the asylum procedure? Normally, this process being a 
part of the asylum procedure, applicants should enjoy the full array of rights foreseen 
by the recast Asylum Procedures Directive and the Greek national law no matter who is 
conducting the interview; the fact that the EU level is operational should not lead to a 
 
176 Ibid.  
177 See EASO Regulation, fourteenth recital and Art. 2, para. 6.  
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diminution of procedural rights. However, on the ground there is uncertainty as to the 
procedural rights available.178  
Finally, another issue is the quality of decision-making that ensues from the in-
volvement of the EU level, meaning the quality of the reasoning as evidenced in the mo-
tivation of the individual acts. Initial practice reveals cause for concern. Notably, this 
processing at hotspots, based on the recommendations of EASO-deployed experts, led 
to several decisions of inadmissibility issued by the Greek Asylum Service on the basis 
that Turkey constituted a safe third country. These were later overturned at appeal lev-
el. As many as 70 rulings of the Appeals Committees rebutted this presumption and 
overturned the related first instance decisions of the Asylum Service, while only two 
upheld the first instance inadmissibility decisions.179 
Thereafter, the Greek asylum law was modified to restructure the synthesis and 
procedures before the Appeals Committees.180 They previously comprised one repre-
sentative of the Ministry of Interior, one UNHCR representative and one representative 
appointed from a list of human rights experts compiled by the National Commission on 
Human Rights. The Committees are now made up of two administrative judges, ap-
pointed by the “General Commissioner of the Administrative Courts”, and one UNHCR 
representative. Experts proposed by the National Commission of Human Rights may 
only take part in the Committees if UNHCR is not in a position to appoint a member. 
The procedures themselves were amended to remove a provision which allowed the 
appellant to request a personal hearing before the Appeals Committees at least two 
days before the appeal.181 The Greek Government ostensibly undertook this move to 
address the “disjunction” between the decisions at first instance that authorised return 
 
178 See Greek Council for Refugees (GCR), Παρατηρήσεις του Ελληνικού Συμβουλίου για τους Πρόσφυγες 
επί του Νόμου 4375/2016 (Observations of the Greek Council for Refugees on Law 4375/2016), 8 April 
2016, www.gcr.gr; C. ZIEBRITZKI, Chaos in Chios, cit.  
179 See ECRE, Greece: Appeal Rules Amended, cit.  
180 This modification took place as part of the same June 2016 package that clarified that EASO 
deployed experts can conduct interviews at hotspots. See Law 4375/2016, Art. 5, para. 2. The modification 
seems to have been supported by the European Commission. A trace of this can be discerned in the 
Commission’s Second Report on the progress made in implementing the EU-Turkey statement. After noting 
that the pace of returns had been slower than expected, and that the great majority of initial inadmissibility 
decisions had been overturned by the Appeals Committees, the Commission notes the legal steps that 
Greece and Turkey have undertaken to achieve further progress, stating: “[t]o ensure full respect of EU and 
international law, Greece and Turkey have both taken a number of legislative and administrative steps. The 
Greek authorities have agreed to further amend their legislation to set up the new Appeal Authority and the 
new Appeal Committees responsible for the judicial review of decisions on applications for international 
protection taken by the Greek Asylum Service”. See European Commission, Second Report on the progress 
made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 349, p. 4.  
181 Namely, Art. 62, para. 1, let. e), of Law 4375/2016 was removed.  
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of applicants to Turkey on the basis that it constitutes a safe third country, and the ex-
tremely high rate of reversal on appeal.182 
IV. The rise of a “European Union Agency for Asylum”: ingraining 
common processing? 
The Commission proposal on a European Union Agency on Asylum183 came as part of a 
first package of legislative measures to reform the CEAS, alongside proposals to reform 
the Dublin system. Overall, it enhances the agency’s mandate and resources, renaming it 
a European Union Agency on Asylum (EUAA). Strangely, the Commission refers to the 
EUAA as a “fully-fledged agency”.184 Despite its prior denomination as an “office”, EASO 
already presented all characteristics of an EU agency,185 therefore this rhetoric should be 
understood more a matter of political emphasis, rather than presenting legal significance. 
The EUAA is based on Arts 78, paras 1 and 2, TFEU that establish a common policy 
on asylum and the goal of a CEAS. Art. 74 TFEU no longer features as part of the legal 
basis, therefore the EUAA is not just a means to achieve administrative co-operation be-
tween national administrations. This reflects the Commission’s statement in April 2016 
that EASO is an integral part of CEAS, as well as part of the agency’s proposed new 
mandate that arguably goes beyond the scope of the concept of “administrative coop-
eration”, such as its envisaged monitoring functions. Despite various policy declarations 
on the importance of EASO as an instrument of realising solidarity, Art. 80 TFEU on the 
principle of solidarity and fair-sharing does not feature as an additional legal basis. The 
Commission remains equivocal regarding its legal understanding, never having posi-
tioned itself clearly on the matter, other than stating that its endorsement on final 
compromises between the Parliament and the Council regarding the legal basis do not 
prejudice its future position. Not invoking Art. 80 TFEU is a sign that the Commission 
retains a cautious approach on this topic.  
In this section I provide a critical overview of the envisaged EUAA mandate in terms 
of operational support. Given the preceding analysis, I focus on new elements, or addi-
tions to the agency’s current mandate. I highlight new trends in the implementation 
modes of the CEAS to ascertain to what extent the emergency-driven responses have 
been internalised. The first article of the new Regulation sets the ambitious tone of the 
proposal: “[t]he European Union Agency for Asylum (the Agency) shall ensure the effi-
cient and uniform application of Union asylum law in Member States. It shall facilitate 
 
182 See press coverage of the first decisions rendered by the modified committees; P. KINGSLEY, 
Reformed Greek Appeals Panel Upholds Syrian Refugee's Deportation, in The Guardian, 12 September 2016, 
www.theguardian.com.  
183 EUAA proposal, cit. 
184 See EUAA proposal, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2. 
185 See analysis above, subsection II.1.a). 
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the implementation and improve the functioning of the Common European Asylum Sys-
tem (CEAS), and it shall be responsible for enabling convergence in the assessment of 
applications for international protection across the Union”.186 
These elements go far beyond support, or administrative cooperation. Rather, it 
seems the EUAA will be the vessel through which the implementation challenges of the 
asylum policy will be overcome. Should this proposal be adopted, the agency’s func-
tions would evolve to include processes that include directly steering implementation, 
as well as a monitoring function. In addition, elements of not only assisted, but also 
common processing would be ingrained in the mandate. The next paragraphs substan-
tiate this point.  
One final point is that the Commission envisages a significant boost in the agency’s 
resources. It raises the perspective of assigning euro 363.9 million to the agency for 
2017-2020.187 This would be accompanied by a significant augmentation in its staff, with 
275 temporary agents and 82 contract agents joining its ranks during 2017-2020, bring-
ing the total number of agency staff to 500 by 2020.188 This would be coupled with en-
hanced obligations on the part of Member States to make available deployed experts, a 
point that I discuss below. 
The proposal better reflects the reality of the work that EASO has already started un-
dertaking, which is that operational assistance is not only offered in situations of dispro-
portionate pressure. Rather than stretching the notion of pressure, or employing the con-
structive ambiguity of “operating plans” and “special support plans”, the proposal clarifies 
that operational assistance may be requested by Member States in implementing their 
obligations with regard to asylum “in particular when their asylum and reception systems 
are subject to disproportionate pressure”.189 This means that assistance through deploy-
ments of ASTs could be envisaged in a broader context, however “for a limited period of 
time”.190 The consequence is that, at least theoretically, the agency cannot take up opera-
tional support in the long run for the implementation of the acquis through deployments, 
and that eventually Member States have to become operationally independent. In prac-
tice, previous analysis in this chapter revealed that some Member States, such as Greece, 
have continuously benefited from one or another type of EASO deployment since the 
agency’s establishment, thus their needs are structural.  
The envisaged measures are variegated. They include preparatory acts of the asy-
lum procedure that do not entail administrative discretion, and thus fall under the um-
brella of what I termed assisted processing. These are, for example, assistance with the 
identification and registration of third country nationals; assistance with the provision 
 
186 See EUAA proposal, Art. 1, para. 1.  
187 See EUAA proposal, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5.  
188 Ivi, pp. 5-6.  
189 See EUAA proposal, Art. 16, para. 1.  
190 Ivi, Art. 16, para. 3.  
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of information on the international protection procedure, or provision of interpretation 
services.191 Such measures do not pose a problem regarding the current implementa-
tion mode arrangements, and do not breach, de jure or de facto, the limits posed by 
administration modes reflecting executive federalism as reflected in the TFEU. 
Another type of envisaged actions arguably fall under the category I defined as 
common processing, since they foresee that deployed experts would conduct actions 
that entail administrative discretion. The Regulation refers first to “facilitat[ing] the ex-
amination of applications for international protection that are under examination by 
the competent national authorities”.192 The next measure is “provid[ing] assistance to 
competent national authorities responsible for the examination of applications for in-
ternational protection”.193 The content of facilitation and assistance is not precise, it 
might indeed refer only to tasks that do not entail administrative discretion. However, a 
subsequent provision referring to the Operational plan includes the following refer-
ence: “regarding assistance with applications for international protection, including as 
regards the examination of such applications, specific information on the tasks that the 
asylum support teams or the experts from the asylum intervention pool may perform 
as well as reference to applicable national and Union law”.194 
Already there is a hint that assistance may involve the examination of applica-
tions, or some part of it. Indeed, as part of the pilots on what EASO called “joint pro-
cessing”, I analysed how experts from Belgium and Sweden conducted asylum inter-
views on behalf of the Dutch Immigration Service, while the latter remained responsi-
ble for issuing the final decision. 
Things are clear where it concerns the migration management teams deployed at 
hotspots.195 The understanding for the migration management teams is the one re-
tained in the EBCG Regulation. Among their tasks the following is stated: “the registra-
tion of applications for international protection and, where requested by Member 
States, the examination of such applications”.196 This formulation leaves little doubt that 
what is contemplated here is the examination of the application itself, rather than assis-
tance, or facilitation of examination. Should this proposal be adopted, it would address 
the current legal ambiguities regarding EASO’s mandate which excludes even indirect 
powers when it comes to the adoption of individual decisions.  
What about the limitations under the TFEU regarding the vertical division of compe-
tences with “a Member State” being responsible for examining an asylum claim? This 
provision on the hotspot related deployments should be read together with the forty-
 
191 Ivi, Art. 16, para. 3, let. a), and para. 3, let. h).  
192 Ivi, Art. 16, para. 3, let. b). 
193 Ivi, Art. 16, para. 3, let. c). 
194 Ivi, Art. 19, let. h).  
195 Ivi, Art. 16, para. 3, let. j).  
196 Ivi, Art. 21, para. 2, let. b) (emphasis added). 
Bottom-up Salvation? From Practical Cooperation Towards Joint Implementation 1029 
sixth recital of the proposed Regulation which states: “[t]he competence to take deci-
sions by Member States' asylum authorities on individual applications for international 
protection remains with Member States”.197 Once again therefore de jure the Regulation 
raises no issues; even if deployed experts have examined an application, it will, at the 
very least, be rubberstamped by “a” national authority. This construct is becoming in-
creasingly artificial, when de facto the reality would be that the merits of the case would 
have been assessed by EU staff or EU-coordinated deployed national experts.  
This brings me to the last set of innovations regarding deployments in the proposal. 
Anticipating that the staff boost in human resources would become a reality, the Regula-
tion foresees that deployees in the ASTs could include the agency’s own staff.198 In addi-
tion, there is a restrictive framework in order to ensure the availability of experts. First, 
the deployment cannot be less than 30 days.199 One must indeed read the statistics 
around current prior deployments with caution, since some of the national experts were 
made available for as little as two-three days, for example in order to deliver a specific 
training session. Second, deployments may or may not relate to a situation of pressure. 
Where they relate to situations of disproportionate pressure, Member States must make 
available the experts they have preliminarily placed in the Asylum Intervention Pool.200 
Currently, they may raise the issue of facing an exceptional situation themselves. This 
would counter the situation observed today where Member States have not been forth-
coming with making available their experts for deployment in Italy and Greece. 
V. Conclusions  
A macroscopic view into what was initially ad hoc practical cooperation activities reveals 
that developments have been rapid and far ranging in this area. The institutionalisation 
of practical cooperation through the establishment of an EU agency was a first decisive 
step into intensifying the EU-coordinated involvement in implementation, a stage initial-
ly designed to be predominantly operationalised by Member States, through their own 
resources. The activities of the agency have grown incrementally, from support activi-
ties with only an indirect steering potential, to the first signs of joint implementation, 
especially through the hotspot approach. The Commission proposal for a new Europe-
an Union Agency on Asylum confirms these trends. 
Overall, prior to the 2015 “refugee crisis”, the majority of EASO’s activities had an 
indirect steering potential and the agency was careful not to overstep its legal mandate. 
EASO’s activities were presented as an opportunity for Member States and they were 
more or less quick to engage with the agency. Even before the activities of assisted, or 
 
197 Ivi, forty-sixth recital.  
198 Ivi, Art. 17, para. 2.  
199 Ivi, Art. 31, para. 7.  
200 Ivi, Art. 22, para. 3.  
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arguably common, processing the working methods of the agency led to greater inte-
gration between the EU level and national administrations. The agency, possessing but 
a small financial envelope and limited human resources, had recourse to Member 
States’ experts in order to fulfil its mandate. A number of EASO outputs are jointly pro-
duced with Member States experts, such as COI reports and training modules.  
Administrative integration is more visible in EASO operations through the asylum 
support teams which are made up predominantly of seconded national experts. The 
first such operations were launched shortly after the agency’s establishment, and grad-
ually they grew in number, as well as in scope. The agency adopted a flexible definition 
of what constitutes pressure and examined this in relative, rather than absolute terms. 
In the case of Luxembourg, the Operating Plan mentions that during 2011, the number 
of asylum seekers almost tripled compared to 2010,201 while “a significant increase of 
37 per cent from 2013 to 2014 is mentioned in the case of Cyprus.202 However, if as-
sessed on an absolute scale, the numbers affecting these smaller Member States are 
not impressive. This approach is correct since every Member State is called to imple-
ment its obligations mainly through its own financial and human resources. Deploy-
ments under ASTs during this first period were not operational in the same sense as the 
FRONTEX border guard teams which interacted with individual migrants at external 
borders. Most of the work consisted in expert advice provided to relevant at ministry 
departments, or involved training and study visits of members of national administra-
tions.  
Gradually, the agency separated deployments from the situation of pressure alto-
gether through the testing of joint processing pilots. These activities are not clearly 
anchored in the EASO Regulation. They started out involving tasks that did not entail 
administrative discretion, such as initial registration, or archiving of data. They 
evolved beyond that, including for example the assessment of the merits of individual 
cases through deployed experts that conducted the asylum interview as in the case of 
the Netherlands pilot. However, they were small scale and short term.  
The next push came through the “refugee crisis”. Previous deployments, although 
beneficial, could not deal with the structural weaknesses of national asylum systems, 
which were due to insufficient human and financial resources of Member States. 
EASO deployees began then to move away from expert consulting and undertake 
more hands-on tasks, such as providing information to arriving third country nation-
als, and assisting with the relocation process. As pressures increased, forms of com-
mon rather than assisted processing emerged in Greece, with deployed experts un-
dertaking admissibility interviews and submitting opinions that, despite being adviso-
ry and non-binding on national authorities, entailed administrative discretion.  
 
201 EASO, Operating Plan for Luxemburg, cit. 
202 EASO, Special Support Plan to Cyprus, cit., p. 3.  
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This new role is ingrained in the May 2016 Commission proposal that envisages an 
agency with a boosted mandate unsettling the status quo. It potentially tasks deploy-
ments with the “examination of claims”, while repeating that the final decision remains 
the competence of Member States. These developments represent a move away from 
the original policy design that each Member State should process the applications of its 
“own asylum seekers” as assigned to it through the Dublin Regulation. It remains to be 
seen to what extent Member States will continue to endorse this trend, both de facto, as 
well as through their position regarding the proposed EUAA Regulation. 
 
